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WHOSE LAW IS IT ANYWAY? 
THE CULTURAL LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
ELIZABETH M. BRUCH* 
"The Court's discussion of these foreign views ... is therefore meaningless 
dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court ... should not impose 
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.'" - Justice Antonio Scalia 
(2003).1 
"It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins 
to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by 
other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality ofthose same rirts 
within our own heritage of freedom."- Justice Anthony Kennedy (2005). 
"We have our own law, we have our own traditions, we have our own 
precedents, and we should look to that in interpreting our Constitution." -
Justice Samuel Alito (2006).3 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the United States and international law is 
complex and evolving, implicating political, cultural, and legal considerations. 
In the realm of international human rights law, the relationship is particularly 
and deeply contested. In recent years, the bounds of that relationship have been 
challenged in the national media, in public discourse, and in all three branches 
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1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster 
v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990,990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 578 (2005). 
3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. A/ito, Jr. to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 370 (2006) (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito), available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/0 1/1 O/AR20060 II 00078l.html 
[hereinafter A/ito Confirmation Hearing]. 
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of the federal government.4 In an era where the public focuses much of its 
attention on the appropriate role of the judiciary, a series of United States 
Supreme Court decisions that cite to international human rights law have been 
controversial. In its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia,5 its 2003 decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,6 and its 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons/ the Supreme 
Court invoked international human rights law and the practice of other nations 
in resolving issues of fundamental rights to life and privacy. 
The Court's action has drawn both praise and vilification and has invited 
serious inquiry into the legitimacy of such a judicial approach. Most scholars 
who have undertaken this inquiry have considered the Supreme Court's 
conduct from either a perspective of comparative constitutionalism,8 or as a 
4. See Charles Lane, The Court is Open for Discussion; AU Students Get Rare Look at 
Justices' Legal Sparring, WASH. PosT, Jan. 14, 2005, at AI (recounting the debate between 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen G. Breyer at American University Washington 
College of Law over the Supreme Court's use of foreign and international law in its decisions); 
Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs. The World, USA TODAY, June 20,2005, at 15A, available 
at2005 WLNR 9728892 (reviewing the current controversy over the use ofintemationallaw by 
the Supreme Court); Abdon M. Pallasch, Justices Shouldn't Cite Foreign Laws, U.S. Attorney 
General Tells Students, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at 24, available at2005 WLNR 
19361771 (reporting Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's remarks against the citation of 
"foreign law" in Supreme Court opinions). 
5. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of the developmentally disabled). 
Although the Court used the descriptive term of"mentally retarded," which was the language 
used in the earlier proceedings, this Article will instead use the term "developmentally disabled" 
to refer to the individuals whose rights are at stake in the decision. 
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a criminal sodomy statute unconstitutional). 
7. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders). 
8. A comparative constitutionalist perspective considers the Supreme Court's citations to 
foreign and international sources principally in determining when, if at all, it is appropriate for a 
domestic court interpreting its national constitution to look to sources outside that constitution 
framework. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tibunals, and the 
Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 913, 926-28 
(2004); Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, 131 PoL'Y REv. 33, 34 
(June - July 2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., United States: Lawrence v. Texas and the 
Imperative of Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 lNT'LJ. CONST. L. 555, 556 (2004); Eric A. 
Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term: Some 
Skeptical Observations, 12 TuLSAJ. COMP. & lNT'L L. 23, 25,36-37 (2004); John Yoo, Peeking 
Abroad?: The Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 26 U. 
HAw. L. REv. 385, 393 (2004). Scholars distinguish between "soft" and "hard" use of foreign 
and international legal sources, including empirical use (evidence), reason-borrowing, 
normative use (moral-factfinding), and use as a matter of comity. Taavi Annus, Comparative 
Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DuKEJ. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 301, 312 (2004) (describing as "soft" the use of foreign materials without 
relying on them in reaching the holding and "hard" use as the direct contribution of comparative 
materials in the holding either through normative reasoning or empirical reasoning). Some 
scholars are critical of all uses, others of "hard" uses. /d.; see also Alford, supra, at 926-27 
(using the "continuum of deference" model, which is used to distinguish between the varying 
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matter of the domestic implementation of international law. 9 As an alternative 
to those perspectives, this Article examines the national controversy over the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons through the lens 
of international human rights law. When states undertake international human 
rights obligations, they become responsible for ensuring compliance with those 
obligations within their domestic legal orders. 10 This state responsibility 
includes punishing violations of human rights, as well as respecting and 
ensuring the free exercise of those rights. 11 Governments are expected to take 
degrees of deference to foreign materials, and generally opposing U.S. deference to these 
materials); Eskridge, supra, at 556-59 (approving use of foreign materials as indicative of an 
"emerging normative consensus," as a matter of"international comity," and as a recognition of 
"pluralism"); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization": 
Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic 
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 Omo ST. L.J. 1283, 1298 (2004) (criticizing domestic use of 
foreign materials unless there is adequate justification for its use); Y oo, supra, at 393 (opposing 
U.S. deference to foreign materials generally). 
9. The main issue from this perspective is whether international law has become binding 
at the domestic level; of course, this would never be an issue regarding foreign law sources. 
See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the Flag and Let It Talk": On the Use of External 
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 2 INTL. J. CONST. L. 597, 608-09 (2004). 
10. The major human rights treaties contain general language of obligation to this effect. 
For example, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
I. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant. 
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 2, U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. N6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
II. /d.; see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No.4, atmf 
164-65 (July 29, 1988) (The obligation of states to ensure free and full exercise of human rights 
"implies the duty of States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all 
the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically 
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights."). 
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the lead in creating domestic conditions that foster fulfillment of their 
international human rights obligations. The relative ease or difficulty of this 
implementation process depends largely on the degree to which the 
international standards comport with existing domestic values.12 
Although the United States has often taken the lead globally in advancing 
international human rights, it has been notoriously reluctant to ratify 
international human rights agreements or to incorporate those agreements into 
domestic law. 13 Some of this reluctance has stemmed from a U.S. perception 
that domestic law already provides significant protection for individual rights. 14 
This sense of international leadership and dominance persists in the current 
resistance to international law, but it has been increasingly overshadowed by 
concerns grounded in the converse notion of isolation and fear that other 
nations are now mandating standards for the United States. 15 Despite frequent 
12. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, I 06 Y ALEL.J. 2599, 
2645-46 ( 1997) (discussing the theory that internalized compliance and obedience will increase 
comportment with international law); see Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under 
International Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
OF WOMEN 167, 169 (Rebecca J. Cooked., 1994) [hereinafter An-Na'im, State Responsibility] 
("In practice, a state's willingness or ability to influence practices based on religious and 
customary laws depends on many factors, any of which could cause difficulty in situations 
where domestic religious and customary laws are likely to be in conflict with internationally 
recognized standards ofhuman rights."). 
13. The current Bush administration is well-known not only for its reluctance to undertake 
international obligations but also for its willingness to disavow them. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. 
Rejects All Support for New Court on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, atAII, available at 
2002 WLNR 4088405 (documenting the Bush administration's ''unsigning" of the International 
Criminal Court treaty, originally signed by President Clinton); U.S. Won't Follow Climate 
Treaty Provisions, Whitman Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A19 (reporting that the Bush 
administration would not support the Kyoto international climate treaty). While previous 
administrations have been more willing to undertake international obligations, they frequently 
placed conditions on those obligations or faced resistance from Congress. See Connie de Ia 
Vega, Human Rights and Trade: Inconsistent Application ofTreaty Law in the United States, 9 
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. I, 11-13 (2004) (criticizing the United States' history of 
conditional ratification); David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. lNT'L L. 129, 139-42 
(1999) (describing the history of ratification ofhuman rights treaties in the United States). 
14. See, e.g., Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Round Table Discussion on International Human 
Rights Standards in the United States: The Case of Religion or Belief, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 
973, 977 (1998) [hereinafter An-Na'im, Round Table Discussion]. The remarks of participant 
Jeremy Gunn illustrate this idea: "[A ]I though the United States does not apply the international 
standards to itself: it nevertheless-with important exceptions-generally acts in accordance 
with international standards and often exceeds them." /d. Another participant, David 
Bederman, echoed this perception of a "culture of compliance" but noted the risks of the United 
States' sense of constitutional exceptionalism. !d. at 982. 
15. See supra note 4; see also Phyllis Schlafly, Is Relying on Foreign Law an 
Impeachable Offense?, EAGLE FORUM, Mar. 16, 2005, 
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2005/mar05/05-03-16.html (expressing outrage that the 
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claims of"American exceptionalism," the United States is currently engaging 
in the same struggle that other nations undergo in the process of reconciling 
international legal standards and obligations with domestic cultural values and 
policy concerns. The United States Supreme Court has been, and continues to 
be, an important part of that process by playing an appropriate, though limited, 
role in advancing the cultural legitimacy of international human rights in the 
United States. 
The national controversy about the Supreme Court's decisions has been 
misguided in several respects that merit brief clarification. As an initial point, 
the public discourse on the issue regularly, and incorrectly, conflates 
international law16 with "foreign law," which is the domestic law of other 
nations. 17 Moreover, the use of these collective "foreign" sources is often 
characterized in a way that suggests that the Court has treated the sources as 
binding or otherwise authoritative. 18 In reality, the Supreme Court has cited 
foreign law19 and internationallaw20 in its decisions, but the Court has never 
Supreme Court used foreign law and international opinion in its Simmons decision). 
16. Three sources comprise international law: treaties, customary law, and general 
principles oflaw. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 
102 (1987). For example, in Roper v. Simmons, when the Supreme Court cited to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Court called it an international authority. 
543 U.S. 551, 575-76 (2005). When the United States is party to a treaty, that treaty is binding 
on the United States as an international legal obligation. REsTATEMENT, supra,§ Ill. The 
treaty is enforceable in U.S. courts if it is self-executing or if it has been implemented by 
domestic legislation. /d. Customary international law is generally binding on all states. /d. §§ 
701-02. 
17. Foreign law sources would include the laws of other countries or the decisions oftheir 
national courts. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court cites foreign law when it cites to 
the criminal legislation of the United Kingdom. 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003). In conflating the 
two, many have referred to both international law and foreign law as "foreign" sources, with the 
pejorative connotations of that term. See, e.g., infra Part II. C. Foreign law, of course, would 
not be binding on a U.S. court (although parties to litigation in a U.S. court may be bound in 
some circumstances by foreign law). 
18. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, I 09th Cong. 293 (2005), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/14/ AR200509140 1445.html [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation 
Hearing] (Question by Senator Coburn: "My question to you is, relying on foreign precedent 
and selecting and choosing a foreign precedent to create a bias outside of the laws of this 
country, is that good behavior?" (emphasis added)); see also A/ito Confirmation Hearing, supra 
note 3, at 370 (Question by Senator Kyl: "What is the proper role, in your view, of foreign law 
in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and when, if ever, is citation to or reliance on these foreign 
laws appropriate?" (emphasis added)). 
19. For example, in Lawrence, the Court cited to British law repealing the criminal laws 
punishing homosexual conduct. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (citing the United Kingdom's 
Sexual Offences Act 1967, c. 60 § 1). Similarly, in Simmons, the Court cited British laws 
prohibiting the execution of juveniles. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 577 (citing the Children and 
Young Person's Act, 1933,23 Geo. 5, c. 12 (U.K.), and the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, II & 12 
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suggested that the foreign or international law sources it cited were binding.21 
The Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons decisions are firmly grounded in domestic 
U.S. law.22 
So why is there a controversy at all? In the current international legal 
system, the formation and development of international law, including 
international human rights law, occurs primarily at the international level 
through the creation of bilateral and multilateral treaties and through 
interpretive mechanisms such as treaty-bodies and international tribunals. In 
contrast, the implementation of international human rights law is primarily 
entrusted to the national or domestic front. 23 Through their governments, 
nation-states are the primary actors in developing and implementin:fi 
international human rights law at both the international and national levels. 
Geo. 6, c. 58 (U.K.)). 
20. The Court cited numerous international human rights treaties in Simmons-including 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576. In Lawrence, the Court cited a 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon 
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R., 52 (1981)). 
21. In its decisions, the Court has often taken pains to emphasize this. See infra Part II. 
22. See discussion of decisions infra Parts Il.B-C. 
23. The international mechanisms to monitor states' compliance with international human 
rights obligations include both "treaty bodies," such as the Human Rights Committee (created to 
monitor compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and non-
treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights Commission, now the Human Rights Council (a 
subsidiary body of the United Nations to monitor general compliance with international human 
rights obligations). But these international mechanisms are generally considered to be avenues 
of last resort. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 4l(c) (requiring exhaustion of all 
available domestic remedies before the Committee will consider a matter); see also Joan 
Fitzpatrick, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in 
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 247, 261-62 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 
1999) (describing the primacy of national mechanisms in protecting human rights). There is a 
presumption in favor of resolving problems at the national level, relying on national 
governments to set up their domestic systems to protect human rights, provide remedies for 
violations, and generally implement international human rights obligations. The primary role of 
the international mechanisms is to establish and develop normative standards. 
24. International human rights law is essentially a modem, post-World War II 
phenomen.)n. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 23, at 3, 4-5. The United States and the 
other victorious Allied Nations played a foundational role in the development of both the 
substantive components of international human rights law and the international monitoring 
mechanisms. I d. United States historians note the important role played by Eleanor Roosevelt 
and others in developing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the foundational human 
rights document, which was later "codified" into the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See 
John P. Humphrey, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 31-33, 42-
43 ( 1984); John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact 
• 
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Nonetheless, there is often popular concern that international human rights law 
at the domestic level represents the view of outsiders "imposed" on the nation, 
and that its domestic use offends national sovereignty and is sure to be out of 
step with domestic views and values. In the United States, this concern 
manifests itself in a wide range of contexts: from the popularity of"Get the US 
out of the UN" bumper stickers,25 or the dismissive presidential rhetoric and 
decision-making,26 to the proposed Congressional "Reaffirmation of American 
Independence Resolution."27 Most immediately, concerns about international 
law are threaded throughout the current controversy over the role of the 
judiciary and the concern that "activist judges" will influence or change 
domestic law in ways that are contrary to domestic values.28 
Concerns about judicial activism and the imposition of"foreign" values are 
not unique to the United States or to the area of international human rights 
law;29 they commonly appear in the human rights arena as an aspect of the 
and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION 21-37 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979). Nonetheless, many legal, philosophical, 
religious, and moral systems find support for the underlying principles of fundament3:l human 
rights in their own traditions and historical roots. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights pmbl., June 27, 1981, 211.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter]. 
25. See, e.g., Cafepress.com, US out of UN - UN out of US!, 
http://www.cafepress.com/unwelcome (last visited Jan. 12, 2007); see also GetUSout.org, Get 
US out! of the United Nations, http://www.getusout.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (describing 
the campaign of the John Birch Society to get the United States out of the United Nations). 
26. The current administration has frequently expressed dissatisfaction and frustration 
with the United Nations. Many view the recent appointment of John Bolton as the U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations as a further indication of this dissatisfaction. Bolton is 
notorious for his anti-U.N. comments; Bolton has stated that "if 10 floors of the 38-story U.N. 
headquarters building were eliminated, 'it wouldn't make a bit of difference."' Charles 
Babington & Dafna Linzer, Bolton Assures Senators of Commitment to U.N., WASH. PosT, Apr. 
12, 2005, at A1, A10. Bolton has also stated, "There is no United Nations. There is an 
international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world-
that's the United States when it suits our interests and when we can get others to go along." 
Editorial, Questioning Mr. Bolton, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A18; see also Christian 
Bourge, Analysis: Bolton Controls Rhetoric, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 11, 2005 ("Bolton has a 
long history of criticizing multinational institutions, and the United Nations in particular .... "). 
27. The Resolution, proposed by U.S. Rep. Feeney and others, states: 
That it is the sense of the House ofRepresentatives that judicial interpretations regarding 
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should not be based in whole or in 
part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of 
the Constitution of the United States. 
H.R. Res. 97, 1 09th Cong. (2005). 
28. A lito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 3, at 410 (statement of Senator Sessions: "We 
believe that there has been a liberal social agenda being promoted too often by the courts that is 
foreign to our history and contrary to the wishes of the American people."); see supra notes 4, 
15. 
29. For example, in the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement, state 
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debate between universalism and cultural relativism. Most international human 
rights advocates, and many of the human rights instruments themselves, assert 
the universality of human rights standards.30 Skeptics often reject these 
sweeping claims in the name of "culture" and cultural relativism; similar 
arguments have been raised by governments that seek to avoid international 
human rights obligations/' and increasingly by a wide spectrum of activists, 
policymakers, and scholars who challenge the hegemony of the "western" view 
of international human rights. 32 In its relatively brief history, international 
and national authorities were concerned about submitting to a "supranational" authority. See 
Stephen Zamora, Allocating Legislative Competence in the Americas: The Early Experience 
Under NAFTA and the Challenge of Hemispheric Integration, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 615, 633 
(1997). 
30. "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world .. 
. . "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; "Considering the 
obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and freedoms .... " International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. This claim of universality is 
derived from the very nature of human rights, which are premised on a common, shared 
humanity and recognition of entitlement to basic human dignity that is equally available to all, 
regardless of distinctions such as race, gender, religion, and other fundamental characteristics. 
In 1993, the principle of universality was explicitly re-embraced at the United Nations World 
Conference on Human Rights: 
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all States to 
fulfil [sic] their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and protection 
of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and international law. The 
universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question. 
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, 1[ I.l, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l57/23 (July 12, 1993). 
31 . See Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok Declaration, 2 
BUFF. J. INT'L L. 215, 226-27 (1996) (quoting a speech by Liu Huaqiu, Head of the Chinese 
Delegation to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, criticizing infringements on 
sovereignty in the name of universal human rights). 
32. The international community and its mechanisms are generally criticized for being 
dominated by western, developed nations, and further criticized because the membership of 
international bodies is overwhelmingly male, even when there is a broader geographical and 
racial distribution. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Problems of Universal Cultural 
Legitimacy for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 
331, 348-53 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990) [hereinafter An-
Na'im, Problems] (discussing the exclusion of non-western participants and perspectives in the 
early development of the international human rights regime); HILARY CHARLESWORTH & 
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 36-37, 
174-79 (2000) (identifying a "Southern" critique of the "Western origins, orientation and 
cultural bias" of the international legal order and noting that both the U.N. membership and its 
bureaucracy are dominated by men). 
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human rights law has attracted legitimate criticisms from those who were left 
out of the process of developing the international standards that they are now 
expected to embrace. Noted human rights scholar Abdullahi A. An-Na'im 
offers two main critiques: first, that the normative development of international 
human rights law has been limited by the dominant influence of the "cultures" 
that developed it; and second, that the real and perceived absence of cultural 
legitimacy at the domestic level has hindered implementation of international 
human rights law. 33 These are, of course, related points because the more 
international human rights law reflects accepted domestic cultural values, the 
greater the likelihood of successful implementation of those laws at the 
domestic level. 34 
An-Na'im has considered the importance of domestic cultural legitimacy 
for the successful implementation of international human rights standards 
primarily in areas of perceived conflict between human rights and Islam. 35 He 
33. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 171 (noting that the argument 
against universal cultural legitimacy of human rights on the ground that "the basic conception 
and major principles . .. emerged from western philosophical and political developments" may 
be true in light offactors such as "the nature and context of the drafting process, the limitations 
of studies purporting to cover a variety of cultural perspectives on the subject and the quality of 
representation of non-western points of view"); see also An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at 
331 (noting that discrepancies between theory and practice in the human rights arena results 
from ineffective enforcement of procedures). 
34. Others have also considered the role of cultural legitimacy as it relates to increasing 
compliance with international law. See Koh, supra note 12, at 2600-02. Koh identifies the 
process as Transnational Legal Process (TLP), which "promotes the interaction, interpretation, 
and internalization of international legal norms." /d. at 2603. Koh distinguishes social, 
political, and legal internalization of norms, including explicit and implicit judicial 
internalization. /d. at 2656-57. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks also discuss coercion, 
persuasion, and acculturation as methods for ensuring compliance with international human 
rights law. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 623 (2004). But others are more reluctant 
to endorse "internalization" of international norms. See Posner, supra note 8, at 34-36 
(criticizing TLP on five grounds: "international law is not always good"; ')udges are not always 
going to act the way we want them to"; ')udges just don't know much about foreign policy, 
foreign countries, and foreign law"; "courts are, by design, passive and reactive"; and "TLP is 
undemocratic"). These themes are echoed in some ofthe dissenting opinions discussed infra. 
35. In his article, State Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law to Change 
Religious and Customary Laws, An-Na'im uses his proposed framework to discuss changing or 
reinterpreting Islamic religious laws to better advance the human rights of women. An-Na'im, 
State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 181-84; see also Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Islam and 
Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate, 94 ASIL PROC. 95, 99-100 (2000) (discussing 
religion and human rights in Mauritius); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality 
of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 29, 54-64 ( 1997) (discussing freedom of expression in Kenya and Sudan); 
Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim Context, 9 
WHlTTIERL. REv. 491,491-97 (1987) [hereinafter An-Na'im,RightsofWomen] (discussing the 
rights of women under Shari'a law). 
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proposes a simple conceptual framework to evaluate and refine international 
human rights law and theory, both in terms of its future development and the 
success of efforts to implement it at the national level. 36 Under this framework, 
internal discourse plays a central role in developing the needed cultural 
legitimacy for human rights norms in the domestic arena, and cross-cultural 
dialogue offers a supporting role to external views in that process.37 
This Article uses Professor An-Na'irn's "internal discourse- cross-cultural 
dialogue" theoretical framework to describe and evaluate the current debate in 
the United States over the use of international human rights standards 
domestically.38 Part I of this Article describes An-Na'irn's model for 
evaluating and advancing the cultural legitimacy of human rights in domestic 
contexts. It briefly addresses the critique that current international human 
rights norms reflect historical and existing power relationships in the 
international community. But it focuses on the interplay of internal discourse 
and cross-cultural dialogue in the domestic implementation of those norms. 
Part II scrutinizes the current debate about the role of international human 
rights law in United States courts through this internal discourse - cross-
cultural dialogue structure as part of the process of increasing the cultural 
legitimacy of human rights in the United States. This Part considers the recent 
Supreme Court decisions in Atkins, Simmons, and Lawrence that implicate both 
domestic constitutional law and, arguably, international human rights law: the 
prohibition of the death penalty for the developmentally disabled and for 
juveniles39 and the affirmation of the freedom of individuals to engage in 
private sexual behavior.40 This Part also briefly addresses the implications of 
36. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 167-69; see also An-Na'im, 
Problems, supra note 32, at 331 (discussing discrepancies between law and practice in the 
human right arena, despite the existence of elaborate standards). He urges testing and use ofhis 
framework in other domestic contexts, as well. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, 
at 184-85. 
37. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174. 
38. An-Na'im himself has been involved in examining the right to freedom of religion in 
the United States and is beginning to consider questions of cultural legitimacy of human rights 
in the United States. See An-Na'im, Round Table Discussion, supra note 14, at 975 (presenting 
the proceedings of a conference on religious liberty in the United States and including remarks 
by An-Na'im). This Article does not focus on the issue of religious rights but will draw upon 
some of the general insights offered by conference participants regarding United States culture 
and the domestic approach to human rights. 
39. Part II.A. considers the recent Supreme Court decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of the mentally disabled) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of juveniles). The death penalty raises domestic 
constitutional concerns under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual 
punishment" and international human rights concerns under conventional and customary 
protection of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
40. Part II.B. considers the recent Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (finding a Texas statute criminalizing certain sexual behavior between same-sex 
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the recent changes to the Supreme Court membership.41 The Article concludes 
that both the Supreme Court's consideration of international and comparative 
law and the resulting controversy are appropriate aspects of the ongoing 
development of domestic law in accordance with international standards. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC CULTURAL LEGITIMACY FOR 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND LAWS 
Understanding the process, and often the struggle, to develop cultural 
legitimacy for human rights standards at the domestic level requires an 
understanding of the recurring critiques of international human rights law, 
notably./: that it is not truly "universal" and does not reflect widely shared 
values. 2 It is within this context that the framework developed by An'Na-im, 
with its emphasis on internal discourse and the supplementary role of cross-
cultural dialogue,43 takes on greater explanatory value and practical 
significance. 
A. Is "International" the Same as "Universal"? An Overarching Critique 
of the Legitimacy of International Human Rights. 
The United States was instrumental in the development of the modem 
international human rights movement.44 To much of the world, the United 
partners unconstitutional). The treatment of same-sex intimate relationships and conduct raises 
domestic constitutional concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty" 
interests and international human rights concerns under conventional and customary protection 
of the right to privacy and freedom from discrimination. 
41. Part II. C. discusses the confirmation hearings of new Chief Justice John Roberts and 
new Justice Samuel Ali to and the views they expressed regarding the use of international and 
foreign law in Supreme Court decisions. 
42. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
43. An-Na' im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174. 
44. Former United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt coined the name "United 
Nations," which was first used in the "Declaration by United Nations" of January 1, 1942. 
United Nations, History of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2007). "In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations 
Charter." !d. Former United States President Harry S. Truman stated: 
My conviction that we had to have a world organization was so deep that I felt that no 
event, no matter how sad and unfortunate, should interfere with the drafting ofthe Charter 
of the United Nations. I felt that there was nothing I could do which would be more fitting 
to the memory of President Roosevelt than to go ahead with the conference. 
Former President Harry S. Truman, Address at the Opera House 273 (June 24, 1955), 
www.un.org/depts/dhllanniversary/stsg6j.pdf. "There have been women who have clearly left 
their mark on the history of the United Nations. Above all, there was Eleanor Roosevelt, who is 
linked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Akmaral Arystanbekova, Diplomacy: 
Too Important to be Left to Men?, 39 UN CHRON. 62, 62 (Sept.-Nov. 2002), available at 
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Nations and the current international human rights legal regime profoundly 
reflect the values and priorities of the United States and other "western" 
democracies. 45 International and domestic human rights advocates often 
struggle with incorporating these "universal" values, which are frequently 
viewed as not universal at all, into particular domestic contexts. As a starting 
point, An-N a' im affirms the general importance of international human rights; 
yet he acknowledges the criticisms regarding the cultural bias inherent in the 
current system.46 This cultural bias comprises both procedural and substantive 
strands: first, the failure to include other ("non-western") perspectives in the 
process of developing the initial human rights standards and system of 
http://www. un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue3/0302p62 _ first__person.html. Mrs. Roosevelt also 
served as Chairperson of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights from 1946 through 
1951. Chairpersons of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/chr/docs/FormerChairpersons.doc (last visited Jan. 12, 
2007); see also An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at 348-53 (discussing the exclusion of non-
western participants and perspectives in the early era of the United Nations). 
45. One critical perspective on human rights is that "human rights as propounded in the 
west are founded on individualism and therefore have no relevance to Asia which is based on 
the primacy of the community." Yash Ghai, The Asian Perspective on Human Rights (1993), 
www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1993vol05no03/20611 (1993). "Some Asian' [sic] 
governments consider that the western pressure on them for an improvement in human rights is 
connected with the project of western global hegemony," which is to be achieved "partly 
through the universalisation of western values and aspirations, and partly through the 
disorientation of Asian state and political systems." /d. The Chinese government has stated that 
"despite its international aspect, the issue of human rights falls by and large within the 
sovereignty of each state." /d. The Bangkok Governmental Declaration recognizes "that while 
human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and 
regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds." /d.; see also 
Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV.lNT'L 
L.J. 20 I, 210 (200 I) ("[H]uman rights, and the relentless campaign to universalize them, 
present a historical continuum in an unbroken chain of Western conceptual and cultural 
dominance over the past several centuries."). 
46. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 172 (noting that there is already 
"significant consensus" on international human rights and that they do provide some "level of 
protection"). An-Na'im continues: 
It is neither possible, nor desirable in my view, for an international system ofhuman rights 
standards to be culturally neutral. However, the claim of such an international system to 
universal cultural legitimacy can only be based on a moral and political "overlapping 
consensus" among the major cultural traditions of the world. In order to engage all 
cultural traditions in the process of promoting and sustaining such global consensus, the 
relationship between local culture and international human rights standards should be 
perceived as a genuinely reciprocal global collaborative effort. 
/d. at 173. 
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protection;47 and second, the "western" philosophical and theoretical origins of 
the current standards and system.48 An-Na'im explains: 
Most African and Asian countries did not participate in the formulation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights because, as victims of colonization, 
they were not members of the United Nations. When they did participate in 
the formulation of subsequent instruments, they did so on the basis of an 
established framework and philosophical assumptions adopted in their 
absence. For example, the pre-existing framework and assumptions favored 
individual civil and political rights over collective solidarity rights, such as a 
right to development, an outcome which remains problematic today. Some 
authors have gone so far as to argue that inherent differences exist between 
the Western notion of human rights as reflected in the international 
instruments and non-Western notions of human dignity. In the Muslim world, 
for instance, there are obvious conflicts between Shari'a and certain human 
rights, especially of women and non-Muslims.49 
Many have questioned the notion of an exclusive "western" provenance to 
the ideas and values underpinning human rights standards. 50 But there is 
validity to critiquing the process's lack of inclusiveness, which involved a 
limited number of actors, most of whom were operating from a western 
perspective. 
The United States presents different challenges to the cultural legitimacy of 
international human rights norms, in light of its different history in the 
international community. The United States has a history of inclusion, and 
even dominance, rather than exclusion. In its foreign policy, the United States 
implicitly and often explicitly expects other nations to conform their domestic 
practices to international law, including international human rights law.51 
47. An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at 346-53. 
48. !d. at 346; An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 171. 
49. Abdullahi Ahmed An-N a 'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World, in THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 315, 317 (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001 ). 
50. See Catherine Powell, Introduction: Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 
30 CoLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 201,204-05 (1999) (discussing human rights principles as they 
relate to the traditions and philosophies of diverse non-western cultures (citing PAUL GoRDON 
LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 9-11 (1998))); see 
also Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 14 & 21, 1997, at 
33, 40 ("Our ideas of political and personal rights have taken their particular form relatively 
recently, and it is hard to see them as 'traditional' commitments of Western cultures .... 
[A]ntecedents can be found plentifully in Asian cultures as well as Western cultures."). 
51. For example, "no [foreign] assistance maybe provided ... to the government of any 
country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." 22 
U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (2000). In addition, "none of the funds made available to carry out this 
chapter, and none of the local currencies generated under this chapter, shall be used to provide 
training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law 
enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program." 22 U.S.C. § 2420(a). The 
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United States civic, religious, and other non-governmental organizations do the 
same.
52 Nonetheless, the United States shares with many other nations the 
phenomenon of resisting outside views on how its domestic laws should 
operate. 53 In contrast to the Islamic nations of Africa and the Middle East, the 
United States played a significant role in the creation of the United Nations 
system and the International Bill of Rights; therefore, both should reflect values 
derived from and compatible with U.S. culture.54 But many in the United 
States perceive that this is not the case. Thus, the acceptance of international 
Secretary or the Administrator "shall not enter into any agreement under this chapter to provide 
agricultural commodities, or to finance the sale of agricultural commodities, to the government 
of any country determined by the President to engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations 
ofinternationally recognized human rights." 7 U.S.C. § 17330)( I). The United States has also 
applied human rights to grounds of inadmissibility. "Any alien who, while serving as a foreign 
government official, was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, particularly severe 
violations of religious freedom, as defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom 
Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6402), is inadmissible." Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 5502, 118 Stat. 3740, 3741 (2004). 
52. Regarding Nigeria's adoption of the Shari'a, Human Rights Watch has stated, 
"Whatever personal beliefs may prevail in different social and religious circles in Nigeria, the 
Nigerian government-both at federal and state level-remains bound by international 
obligations and conventions." Human Rights Watch, Failure to Conform to International 
Human Rights Standards (Sept. 2004), www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0904/l5.htm. "The 
UDHR is widely recognized as customary international law. It is a basic yardstick to measure 
any country's human rights performance. Unfortunately, Cuba does not measure up." Human 
Rights Watch, Cuba's Repressive Machinery (1999), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/cuba/Cuba996-0l.htm. "Cuban courts continue to try and 
imprison human rights activists, independent journalists, economists, doctors, and others for the 
peaceful expression of their views, subjecting them to the Cuban prison system's extremely poor 
conditions." !d. "While Cuba's domestic legislation includes broad statements of fundamental 
rights, other provisions grant the state extraordinary authority to penalize individuals who 
attempt to enjoy their rights to free expression, opinion, press, association, and assembly." !d. 
It has been recommended that "[t]he Cuban government should cease all prosecutions based on 
the individual' s exercise of fundamental rights to free expression, association, and movement," 
and that "[t]he Cuban government should reform its Criminal Code, repealing or narrowing the 
definition of all crimes that are in violation of established international human rights norms and 
practices." !d. 
53. See supra notes 4, 15. 
54. This should particularly be true with regard to civil and political rights. For example, 
the Declaration of Independence famously states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights echoes this 
language in its Preamble ("Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world[.]"), in Article I ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights."), and Article 3 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person."), and 
in other provisions. UDHR, supra note 30, at 71-72. 
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human rights norms relies not solely on the nation's involvement in the historic 
and ongoing development of those norms at the international level, but also on 
the domestic process of acceptance and implementation. 
B. Grounding the "Universal" in a Specific Cultural Context: Process and 
Bottom-Line Results. 
Ultimately, the current international system must operate as a starting point 
for any analysis or proposed change. The existing human rights regime has 
many strengths, including the simple facts of its existence and endurance as a 
legal and political framework. 55 After more than sixty years of history, most 
participants and observers agree that certain shared fundamental values do 
exist, such as the prohibitions of genocide, slavery, torture, and systematic 
discrimination.56 Now, the focus of critical reform efforts should be on 
increasing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and inclusiveness of the existing 
human rights legal regime: 
Since we already have an international system of human rights law and 
institutions, the process should seek to legitimize and anchor the norms of this 
established system within, and between, the various cultural traditions of the 
55. One of the basic purposes of the United Nations since its founding in 1945 has 
included the protection of internationally recognized human rights. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. 
In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly established a Commission on Human Rights, 
and in 1948 it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations and its 
member states are currently engaged in efforts to reform the United Nation's existing human 
rights mechanisms by creating a new Human Rights Council. See Warren Hoge, With Its 
Human Rights Oversight Under Fire, U.N. Submits a Plan for a Strengthened Agency, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at A6, available at 2006 WLNR 1901893. 
56. These are considered jus cogens norms, part of binding, customary and conventional 
internationa11aw. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 ( 1987). See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. N39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (establishing that torture is never justified under any 
circumstance); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
G.A. Res. 34/ 180, at 193, U.N . GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. N34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) 
[hereinafter CEDA W] (promoting equal rights and condemning any distinction based on sex); 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 
2106A, at 47, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. N6014 (Dec. 21 , 1965) (recognizing that 
racial discrimination is repugnant to human society); Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A, at 174, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. 
Doc. N810 (Dec. 9, 1948) (confirming that genocide is a crime under international law); 
International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 
2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/flsc.htm (affirming 
the intent to abolish slavery in all its forms throughout the world). An-Na'im uses the shared 
fundamental principles of nondiscrimination and legal equality in his work on increasing human 
rights protections for women and non-Muslims under Shari ' a law. See, e.g., An-Na'im, State 
Responsibility, supra note 12, at 181-82; An-Na'im, Rights of Women, supra note 35, at 502. 
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world. In other words, the norms of the international system should be 
validated in terms of the values and institutions of each culture, and also in 
terms of shared or similar values and institutions of all cultures. This can be 
achieved, I suggest, through what I call "internal discourse" within the 
framework of each culture, and "cross-cultural dialogue" among the various 
cultural traditions of the world. 57 
"Internal discourse," defined as the discussion and debate on the 
application and implementation of human rights at the domestic level, is 
important in several respects. Internal discourse must serve as the prim~ 
mechanism for advancing the cultural legitimacy of human rights norms. 8 
Human rights are presumed to be protected initially and primarily at the 
domestic level. 59 Additionally, internal discourse is important as a means to 
educate and socialize, which aids in developing both consensus and credibility 
for the standards adopted. 60 Internal discourse serves as a global equalizer of 
sorts, a manifestation of the reciprocal nature of the process. A nation with a 
visible internal process draws attention to its treatment of human rights issues, 
and also serves as a model for other nations.61 At the same time, this visible 
57. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174. An-Na'im does not necessarily 
endorse the desirability of all existing human rights norms but instead is interested in using 
them as a starting point for further development. 
58. See id. at 169 (given "the nature ofinternationallaw in general, and its dependence on 
largely voluntary compliance and cooperation of sovereign states in the field of human rights in 
particular," it is necessary to seek greater consensus in the domestic cultural context). 
Accordingly, decisions about how to challenge particular domestic laws should be left to the 
process of internal discourse. 
59. See supra note 24. 
60. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174, 178-79. Addressing this 
issue in the context of reconciling international human rights with customary and religious laws 
in Muslim countries, An-Na'im explains: 
[I]t is clear that the only viable and acceptable way of changing religious and customary 
laws is by transforming popular beliefs and attitudes, and thereby changing common 
practice. This can be done through a comprehensive and intensive program offormal and 
informal education, supported by social services and other administrative measures, in 
order to change people's attitudes about the necessity or desirability of continuing a 
particular religious or customary practice. To achieve its objective, the program must not 
only discredit the religious or customary law or practice in question, but also provide a 
viable and legitimate alternative view ofthe matter. 
!d. at 178. 
61. An-Na'im provides two main rationales for the importance of internal discourse: 
First, internal validation is necessary in all cultural traditions for one aspect or another of 
the present international human rights system. . . . Second, for such discourse within one 
culture to be viable and effective, its participants should be able to point to similar 
discourse which is going on in the context of other cultures. 
!d. at 174. 
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internal process underscores the notion that no nation is immune from having to 
adjust its national system to comport with international obligations.62 
The mechanism of cross-cultural dialogue functions as a significant 
counterpart and supplement to internal discourse.63 External actors may 
directly encourage dialogue in numerous ways, such as "international action to 
protect the freedoms of speech and assembly of internal actors . . . and 
assistance in developing and implementing campaign strategies.'M Cross-
cultural dialogue may also involve strategic use of external resources, such as 
the laws and practices of different nations or "the exchange of insights and 
experiences about the concept of the particular human ~ht and the 
sociopolitical context of its implementation" by internal actors.6 In addition, 
reciprocity plays a role in increasing acceptance of cross-cultural input and in 
establishing basic thresholds for compliance with human rights standards.66 
But cross-cultural dialogue must function primarily as a supplement to internal 
discourse. There is always a risk that if external actors take an overly active 
role in the internal process of reinterpreting cultural norms, their involvement 
may be counter-productive and may even alienate those generally supportive of 
human rights norms. 67 Again, this is particularly true in areas that are 
suspicious of "western" influence based on a history of colonialism and 
religious conflict. 68 
62. See id. (explaining that internal validation "might be necessary for civil and political 
rights in one culture, economic and social rights in another, the rights of women or minorities in 
a third, and so forth"). 
63. See id. An-Na'im offers two main rationales regarding the importance of cross-
cultural dialogue: 
First, from a methodological point of view, all participants in their respective internal 
discourses can draw on each other's experiences and achievements. Second, cross-cultural 
dialogue will enhance understanding of, and commitment to, the values and norms of 
human dignity shared by all human cultures, thereby providing a common moral and 
political foundation for international human rights standards. 
/d. 
64. /d. at 179. For example, the use of letter-writing or "urgent action" campaigns by 
Amnesty International and other non-governmental organizations are often directed at 
protecting the right to freedom of expression. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Act Now for 
Human Rights, http://www.arnnesty.orglactnow/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (including appeals 
to protect "human rights defenders"). 
65. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 179. 
66. See An-Na'im, Problems, supra note 32, at 345. For instance, in his approach to 
reconstructing the relationship between Islam and human rights, An-Na'im focuses on particular 
examples, such as the treatment of women and non-believers. See id. In arguing for a 
reinterpretation of existing Islamic law, he suggests incorporation of the principle of reciprocity 
as one way of reconciling the nondiscrimination principles of human rights with current 
interpretations ofShari'a law. /d. 
67. An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 179-80. 
68. See id. at 184; see also Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: 
Rethinking the Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 259, 291 (2004) 
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Although An-Na'im employs the internal discourse cross-cultural 
dialogue construct to suggest means of reconciling international human rights 
standards with Islamic law in particular national contexts, this theoretical 
framework has broader application, as well. In this era of globalization, all 
nations face a similar challenge--to a greater or lesser degree--of reconciling 
international human rights standards with their existing national legal system, 
which incorporates both the formal legal structure and the informal influence of 
culture, religion, and custom. 69 Resistance to human rights standards generally, 
or more commonly to particular rights, is rooted in this informal system of 
norms and values. 70 Moreover, the resistance to international law at the 
domestic level rarely centers on the content of the norm itself, but rather on the 
interpretation and specific implementation of the norm in the particular 
domestic situation.7 Appreciation of this strategic interplay of internal 
("Formerly subjugated people's suspicions of human rights values emanating from colonial 
powers must be viewed as part of the legacy of colonialism. The logic of these suspicions is 
easy to discern, as people denied autonomy seek to establish cultural self-determination. 
Misgivings about a human rights agenda originating from former colonizers is not 
unreasonable."). 
69. This expansive obligation is often reflected in general treaty language. See, e.g., 
ICCPR, supra note I 0, at art. 2; see also CEDA W, supra note 56, at art. 3 ("States Parties shall 
take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of 
women . . . . "). 
70. An-Na'im's definition of culture broadly includes religion and custom. An-Na'im, 
Problems, supra note 32, at 335-36. He notes: 
The prime feature underlying cultural legitimacy is the authority and reverence derived 
from internal validity. A culturally legitimate norm or value is respected and observed by 
the members of the particular culture, presumably because it is assumed to bring 
satisfaction to those members. Because there may be conflicts and tensions between 
various competing conceptions of individual and collective satisfaction, there is constant 
change and adjustment of the norms or values in any culture which are accorded respect 
and observance. 
!d. at 336. Since this informal system of norms and values is particularly powerful in the 
context of discrimination against women, the obligations ofparties to CEDAW are especially 
broad. The CEDA W Resolution states: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women. 
CEDAW, supra note 56, at art. 5(a). The Resolution also states that CEDAW will "take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, 
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women." !d. at art. 2(f). 
71 . For example, few nations or activists currently would contest a general prohibition on 
discrimination on the basis of race or gender. But many would contest the meaning of that 
general prohibition in their particular domestic contexts. An-Na'im discusses the interpretation 
of gender-based discrimination under Islamic law. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra 
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discourse and cross-cultural dialogue72 offers a simple methodology for 
approaching the complexities of implementing human rights standards in the 
wide variety of domestic contexts in today's global community and for ensuring 
the cultural legitimacy-and ultimate effectiveness-of those standards. 
II. A HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
The role of the executive branch in international law is familiar: treaty-
making, foreign policy development, and diplomacy. 73 The role of the 
legislative branch is familiar, as well: providing advice and consent to treaties, 
and adopting implementing legislation.74 But less attention has been given to 
the important role of domestic courts in implementing the nation's international 
obligations, particularly its international human rights law obligations.75 
Domestic courts may directly apply international standards, 76 but given the 
general nature of the standards at the international level, domestic courts also 
play a role by interpreting those standards in their domestic context.77 The 
note 12, at 181 . In the United States, there are ongoing debates about the appropriateness of 
affirmative action programs. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-71 (2003); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003). Note that Justice Ginsberg cites to international human 
rights law in her concurrence in Grutter. ld. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
72. See An-Na'im, State Responsibility, supra note 12, at 174 (stating that "the 
combination of the processes of internal discourse and cross-cultural dialogue will, it is hoped, 
deepen and broaden universal cultural consensus on the concept and normative content of 
international human rights"). 
73. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 303 
(describing the President's role in authorizing or approving international agreements). 
74. I d. (describing Congress's role in authorizing or approving international agreements). 
75. See id. § 115 n.3 (explaining that "courts will give effect to international law 'where 
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,' and 'in the 
absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the matter'" 
(quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900)). The high courts of a few 
nations have been the exception; for example, the post-apartheid South African Supreme Court 
and the Canadian Supreme Court frequently cite to materials from other nations to support their 
holdings. See Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L 
L. 409,416-17 (2003) (providing a case study of the Supreme Court of Canada); Cody Moon, 
Note, Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United States Supreme Court Join the 
Dialogue?, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 229, 232-39 (2003) (discussing the high courts of 
Canada, South Africa and Australia). Additionally, other high courts have drawn notice for 
high profile cases such as the British, Spanish and Chilean courts considering the Pinochet 
prosecution. See Amnesty International, The Case of Augusto Pinochet: Timeline, 
http:/ /news.arnnesty.orglpages/pinochet_ timeline (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (highlighting the 
involvement of the United Kingdom and Chilean courts in the Pinochet case). 
76. In United States courts, this happens when treaty provisions are self-executing or 
when the court applies customary international law. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF FoREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § Ill. 
77. This is specifically accounted for in the doctrine of "margin of appreciation" 
employed by the European Court of Human Rights and other international human rights bodies: 
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Supreme Court has had opportunities to ensure the direct implementation of 
international human rights standards domestically (and in turn, to play a role in 
developing international jurisprudence on human rights), but the Court has 
been cautious about doing so thus far.78 
Nevertheless, the Court has increasingly played another perhaps more 
important role in advancing the cultural legitimacy of particular human rights 
standards. In the Supreme Court, Congress, and the public life, the current 
debates over the use of international law are truly about cultural legitimacy of 
the international human rights standards, rather than domestic 
implementation. 79 What generates the passion is not whether a particular treaty 
or norm is self-executing, but whether the treaty or norm represents the values 
Although the Commission and Court [now Court] invoke the principle of strict 
interpretation and thus the favourable balancing of individual rights against state interests, 
they in fact leave a certain amount of discretion for the states to decide whether a given 
course of action is compatible with Convention requirements. This state discretion is 
referred to as the "margin of appreciation." 
DoNNA GoMIEN, DAVID HARRJS & LEO ZWAAK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 215 (Council of Europe 
Publishing 1996). The doctrine reflects the view that "state authorities are in principle in a 
better position than the international judge" to assess the balance of rights in particular domestic 
contexts. Jd. (quoting Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976)). 
Moreover, persuasive domestic jurisprudence finds its way back into the decisions of 
international bodies. For example, the European Court of Human Rights provides a list of its 
cases where it has drawn upon comparative law in its reasoning. See European Court ofHuman 
Rights, Selective Comparative Law Case List, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHRIEN/Header/Case-
Law/Case-law+information/Selective+comparative+law+case+list/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
78. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720-21 (2004) (adopting a narrow 
understanding of"the law of nations" in determining the scope of the Alien Tort Statute). 
79. The Supreme Court has a mixed history regarding the protection of individual rights. 
There are cases that pre-date the modem international human rights movement that still address 
important human rights issues including discrimination. See generally Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 ( 1944) (analyzing the legality of a civilian exclusion order that curtailed 
the rights of a particular ethnic group); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)(finding that a 
statute that distinguished between races was constitutional); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 
(1872) (affirming the denial of a woman's law practice application); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393 (1856) (dismissing an action brought by a slave because he was not considered a 
citizen). More recently, however, the Court has adopted a new mentality that progressively 
defines and even extends individual rights protection. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (finding that abortion is within the scope of personal liberty guaranteed by the 
Constitution); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that segregation was 
unconstitutional). But within the Court, much debate remains regarding the issue of domestic 
implementation and application of international law. For example, in another recent and 
controversial Supreme Court decision, the issue was not cultural legitimacy, but rather the 
complications of discerning and applying international human rights norms where there is 
statutory authorization to do so under the Alien Tort Statute. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28. In that 
case, the Court did not focus on whether "international" norms made sense and helped us 
understand our own law, but on whether the norms could be directly applied. Jd. 
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of the United States or the imposed values of outsiders.80 The Court's 
decisions in Atkins, Simmons, and Lawrence embody and advance this ongoing 
internal discourse - cross-cultural dialogue process. 
The United States Supreme Court's opinions address the criminal law 
issues of the death penalty and the criminalization of particular sexual conduct, 
but they also raise important constitutional and human rights questions about 
individual liberty, privacy, and dignity. 81 Both areas implicate values 
traditionally associated with the U.S. criminal justice system (deterrence, 
punishment, retribution, rehabilitation, and accountability) and strong religious 
and cultural values (vengeance, mercy, procreation, and the sanctity of intimate 
relationships). 
Internal discourse regarding the imposition of the death penalty is active 
and enduring in the United States;82 the treatment of same-sex relationships and 
sexual conduct is also the subject of wide-ranging domestic debate.8 The 
80. A common criticism of the use of international and foreign legal sources in the 
decisions has been that such use is "undemocratic," or anti-democratic. See e.g., Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's use of 
foreign laws is "antithetical to considerations of federalism"). But see Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court 
Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. I, 32,42-44 (2005) (arguing that the view of the Supreme Court as a 
counter-majoritarian institution is flawed and examining the Court's decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas as an example of the Court's majoritarian nature). 
81. This process of cultural legitimization also is demonstrated in other contexts, such as 
the Court's consideration of the "death row phenomenon," and affirmative action. See Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,275 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,329 (2003); Foster v. 
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999). 
82. There are numerous organizations that are active in opposition to the death penalty in 
the United States. For example, Amnesty International lists over twenty organizations in the 
United States. Amnesty International, External Links: Death Penalty, 
http://web.arnnesty.orgllinks/bytheme?readform&restricttocategory=DEATH+PENALTY&coun 
t=30 {last visited Jan. 12, 2007); see also Death Penalty Information Center, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (providing information on issues 
concerning death penalty). Twelve states and the District of Columbia have no death penalty. 
Amnesty International USA, Abolish the Death Penalty, 
http://www.arnnestyusa.org/abolish/states/index.html {last visited Jan. 12, 2007). Other 
organizations actively support the death penalty. ProDeathPenalty.com lists numerous 
organizations that support the death penalty and provides links to supportive or neutral sites. 
ProDeathPenalty.com, Death Penalty Links, http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/links2.htm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2007). The Prosecutor's Office in Clark County, Indiana, also has a website that 
provides a statement supporting the death penalty and provides links to other pro-death penalty 
sites. Steven D. Stewart, A Message from the Prosecuting Attorney, 
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/deathldeath.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
83. There are also many organizations active on issues related to same-sex relationships. 
The Human Rights Campaign is a prominent advocacy group that works for lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender equal rights. See Human Rights Campaign, Working for Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender Equal Rights, http://www.hrc.org/ {last visited Jan. 12, 2007). Others 
are active in opposition. See, e.g., Focus on the Family ACTION, http://www.focusaction.org/ 
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Supreme Court's decisions in these areas reflect internal discourse and 
ultimately contribute to it. The decisions have generated controversy largely 
due to their content and outcomes, but also due in part to their explicit 
references to foreign and international law in support of their outcomes. The 
cross-cultural dialogue that appears in the decisions has been used as merely a 
supplement, yet it has provoked public outcry. On the issue of the death 
penalty, U.S. law and policy appears out-of-step with the worldwide trend 
towards abolition;84 on the issue of privacy and liberty in intimate conduct, the 
United States is arguably in the vanguard for protecting individual rights.85 
A. The "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society "86: Lessons from Atkins and Simmons about the Human 
Right to Life. 
From an international human rights law perspective, although the standards 
regarding the death penalty continue to evolve, the standards are relatively well-
established. There is a general consensus internationally that the death penalty 
conflicts with the right to life and the right to security of the person; thus, the 
death penalty should be abolished. 87 If exceptions are allowed, they are quite 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
84. According to Amnesty International, 128 countries have abolished the death penalty 
by law or in practice. Of the remaining 69 countries, only a small number actually execute 
prisoners, and the global trend is towards abolition. Amnesty International, Facts and Figures 
of the Death Penalty, http://web.arnnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited Jan. 12, 
2007). 
85. Several European countries provide some legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
including: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg and Britain. Gay Marriage Around the Globe, BBC NEWS, Dec. 
22, 2005, http:/ /news. bbc.co. uk/ 1/hi/world/americas/4081999 .stm. Other countries that provide 
either marriage or similar recognition include Canada, Argentina, New Zealand, and South 
Africa. !d. The Human Rights Campaign also lists Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia, 
and Switzerland as providing some legal recognition or benefits to same-sex couples. See 
Human Rights Campaign, Marriage/Relationship Recognition Laws: International, 
http://hrc.org!femplate.cfrn?Section=Center&CONTENTID=26546&TEMPLATE=/TaggedPag 
e/TaggedPageDisplay.cfrn&TPLID=70 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
86. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), quoted in Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,561 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311-12 (2002). 
87. All major human rights treaties provide for the right to life, the right to security of the 
person, and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. See ICCPR, supra 
note 10, at art. 6, 7, 9 ("Every human being has the inherent right to life .. . . No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ... Everyone 
has the right to liberty and security of person."); African Charter, supra note 24, at art. 4, 5, 6 
("Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person . .. . 
All forms of ... cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited ... . 
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person."); American 
Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," art. 4, 5, 7, Apr. 8, 1970, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 144, 145-46 [hereinafter ACHR] ("Every person has the right to have his life 
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narrow and framed within a context of moving toward eventual abolition.88 
This is certainly true for the nations that the United States views as sharing its 
history, traditions and values.89 Moreover, most of the world favors abolishing 
the death penalty.90 The international preference for abolishing the death 
penalty is magnified when examining the specific contexts of execution of the 
developmentally disabled or of juveniles.91 Although many international 
respected. . . . No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
punishment or treatment. ... Every person has the right to personal liberty and security."); 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, 3, 5, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224, 226 [hereinafter European Convention] ("Everyone's right to life 
shall be protected by law .... No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. ... Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person."). 
88. For example, after the general assertion in Article 6 that"[ e ]very human being has the 
inherent right to life," the ICCPR further provides: 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of 
the commission of the crime .... 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the 
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all 
cases. 
6. Nothing in this [A]rticle shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant. 
ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 6. The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is specifically 
directed towards the abolition of the death penalty and provides, "Each State Party shall take all 
necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction." Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1 (entered into force on 
July 11, 1991). 
89. For example, the European Convention sets out an explicit right to life in Article 2: 
"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law." European Convention, supra note 87, at art. 2. In 
addition, the Convention has established a specific protocol regarding the death penalty. See 
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, C.E.T.S. No. 114 (ratified by all 
members ofthe Council of Europe except Russia). 
90. See supra note 87. For an up-to-date report of which countries currently practice the 
death penalty and which have abolished or abandoned it, see Amnesty International, Abolitionist 
and Retentionist Countries, http://web.arnnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
91. Several countries have recently raised the minimum age for the death penalty to 18 
years old, including: Yemen, Zimbabwe, China and Pakistan. Amnesty International, Stop 
Child Executions!, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-children-eng (last visited Jan. 12, 
2007). Recent decisions by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have held that 
the prohibition ofthe execution ofjuvenile offenders constitutes a jus cogens norm. Domingues 
v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02, mf 84-85 (2002), available 
at www.cidh.org; Beazley v. United States, Case No. 12.412, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
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human rights norms appear to Jack consensus, either by treaty participation or 
by state practice, the norms regarding the human rights violations inherent in 
the death penalty are widely agreed upon. In fact, the United States is an 
anomaly regarding its death penalty doctrine.92 
Nonetheless, internal discourse about the death penalty continues to occur, 
particularly in the United States.93 In fact, internal discourse is implicit in the 
standards set forth in the Constitution; the Eight Amendment's prohibition of 
"cruel and unusual" punishment94 suggests an ongoing evaluation of the 
punishment against other standards to ensure that it is "graduated and 
proportioned to [the] offense."95 In that evaluation, the Supreme Court 
established a standard that considers "the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society. "96 Not only does the Court's standard 
contain an inherently comparative function, but the Court also firmly grounds 
its standard in "the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all 
persons. "97 
Although the United States has not abolished the death penalty,98 the 
Supreme Court has recently limited its scope: in Atkins v. Virginia, 99 the Court 
101/03, m!47-50 (2003), available at www.cidh.org. The ICCPR, Article 6, also provides, 
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years 
of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 6. 
92. In the context of the juvenile death penalty, the Court in Simmons stated that "it is fair 
to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the 
juvenile death penalty." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,577 (2005). Although some may 
suggest that the United States may ignore international human rights law because the country 
already has a culture of compliance with individual rights, that argument is not available in this 
context. 
93. The Supreme Court is, of course, not the only participant in this discourse. See supra 
note 82 (listing active organizations that advocate in favor of and against the death penalty). 
The United States' resistance to international pressure to abolish or limit the death penalty may 
reflect cultural values of independence and individual accountability, and cultural influences of 
fear, violence, and racism. Nonetheless, domestic and international advocates of human rights 
standards have been somewhat effective in changing the nation's views in this area, often by 
using the method An-Na'im articulated, which reinterprets values embraced by and in the 
United States to argue against the death penalty. 
94. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. Vlll. 
95. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 
(1910)). 
96. /d. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 {1958) (plurality opinion)). 
97. !d. at 560 ("By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth 
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons."). 
98. In 1972, the Supreme Court found that the death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment when its imposition was left to the sole discretion of juries; consequently, all states 
were required to rewrite their death penalty laws. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 
(1972). But in 1976, the Court allowed executions to resume in the United States. Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
99. 536 u.s. 304, 321 (2002). 
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prohibited the execution of the developmentally disabled, and in Roper v. 
Simmons, 100 the Court prohibited the execution ofjuveniles. In both Atkins and 
Simmons, the Court evaluated the historical debate about the death penalty in 
the United States and, noting the evolution of public sentiment, reversed earlier 
decisions.101 The Court reviewed the "objective indicia of consensus" on the 
death penalty by looking to the actions of the individual states, professional 
associations, non-profit organizations, academia, and others with relevant 
information or perspective in assessing the "evolving standards of decency."102 
The Court's reliance on international materials in the Atkins and Simmons 
opinions created a greater controversy than the actual holdings themselves. 103 
The Court looked beyond resources in the United States to the practices of 
other nations, 104 as well as the various perspectives within the international 
community.105 In both Atkins and Simmons, the Court's analysis of the 
100. 543 u.s. 551, 578 (2005). 
I 01. !d. at 564-69; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17. 
102. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563, 567. The majority of the states prohibited the juvenile 
death penalty at the time of the decision in Simmons. !d. at 568; see also HOWARD N. SNYDER & 
MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENlLE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89, 133 
(National Center for Juvenile Justice 1999). But see Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The 
Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 148 (1997). The Court referred to numerous amici curiae in 
both Atkins and Simmons. For example, in Atkins, amici included the American Psychological 
Association, the United States Catholic Conference, and the European Union. Atkins, 536 U.S. 
at 316-17 n.21. In Simmons, amici included the European Union, President James Earl Carter, 
Jr., Former U.S. Diplomats, and the Human Rights Committee of the Bar ofEngland and Wales. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576. 
103. The controversy also exists within the Court. Some Justices, notably Breyer, Kennedy 
and Ginsburg, support the use of international and comparative materials. See supra note 4; 
infra note 194. Other Justices are deeply opposed to the use of international and comparative 
materials, notably Scalia and Thomas. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinions in 
Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v. Simmons; Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court in 
Atkins v. Virginia. Chief Justice Roberts has not yet had an occasion to address this issue in an 
opinion. But in his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts responded to questions about 
the use of intemationallaw in court decisions in the United States by stating: "I don't think it's 
a good approach ... I'd accuse them of getting it wrong on that point, and I'd hope to sit down 
with them and debate it and reason about it." Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 18, at 
293 (statement of Judge John Roberts). He cited concerns arising under "democratic theory" 
and concerns regarding the problems of selectivity and lack of restraints on judicial discretion. 
!d. Justice Ali to expressed similar, yet stronger, views regarding the same. A lito Confirmation 
Hearing, supra note 3; see infra Part II.C. 
104. The Court's references to international views and practices did not begin in the 
Simmons and Atkins opinions. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Court 
looked to the views of "other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the 
leading members of the Western European community." !d. at 830. 
105. There have been an increasing number of direct interventions by other States on this 
issue. Most recently, other countries have used the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
to intervene in the cases of foreign death row inmates in the United States. See, e.g., Avena and 
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"evolving standards of decency"106 draws heavily upon the internal discourse 
regarding the death penalty and selectively deploys cross-cultural dialogue to 
increase the cultural legitimacy of the decision. 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of 
the death penalty for the developmentally disabled. 107 In 1989, the Court had 
examined this issue in Penry v. Lynaugh and concluded that the constitutional 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment did not preclude the execution of 
those who are developmentally disabled. 108 But fourteen years later, the Court 
reached the opposite conclusion inAtkins.109 The main emphasis in Atkins was 
the changing nature of the internal discourse regarding the execution of those 
who are developmentally disabled. 110 The Court detailed the actions of state 
legislatures to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for the 
developmentally disabled in the years after its decision in Penry. 111 The Court 
considered not only the number of states that had changed their laws, but also 
the "consistency of the direction of change" to determine that a national 
consensus had developed against the practice. 112 The Court's only reference to 
a cross-cultural influence was in a footnote addressing the views of the "world 
community."113 But in the same note, the Court addressed the opinions of 
domestic professional and religious organizations, as well as polling data 
regarding the opinions of the American public. 114 The Court briefly noted that 
"within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."115 
Given the majority's limited inclusion of cross-cultural perspectives in 
Atkins, the depth in which the dissenting opinions addressed the matter is quite 
surprising. In his dissent, then Chief Justice Rehnquist Goined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas), wrote separately to "call attention to the defects in the 
Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 20041.C.J. 128 (Mar. 2004) (finding the 
United States in violation of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations). 
106. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
107. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. 
108. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). 
109. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
110. Seeid. at315-18. 
Ill. !d. at 314-15. The Court noted that, in the intervening years, "the American public, 
legislators, scholars, and judges" had deliberated over the question and "[t]he consensus 
reflected in those deliberations" influenced the Court's conclusion. !d. at 307. 
112. /d.at315. 
113. /d.at316-17n.21. 
114. !d. (citing the Brief for European Union as Amicus Curiae). The Court found 
domestic support for its decision in a broad "social and professional consensus." !d. The Court 
also found international support from the overwhelming disapproval of the ''world community" 
for the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by the developmentally disabled. 
!d. 
115. !d. 
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religious organizations, and opinion polls."116 Rehnquist rejected any 
comparative aspect to the evaluation ofthe "evolving standards of decency'': "I 
fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the punishment 
of their citizens provide any support for the Court's ultimate determination .... 
For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are looking, then the 
viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant. " 117 Justice Scalia, in his 
dissent (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas), escalated the 
rhetorical approach of the dissent in rejecting the views of the international 
community: "[T]he Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 
'national consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) 
to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of 
the so-called 'world community,' and respondents to opinion polls."118 Both 
dissenting opinions sought to limit or qualify the sources the Court may 
consider in evaluating the domestic internal discourse regarding the death 
penalty.119 Moreover, by focusing exclusively on a "national consensus" and 
dismissing outside views "imposed" on Americans, the dissenting Justices 
forcefully rejected the majority's consideration of cross-cultural dialogue. 120 
In Simmons, the Court followed a path of analysis similar to the analysis in 
Atkins in addressing the constitutionality of the death genalty for a juvenile 
under age eighteen at the time the crime was committed. 21 Prior to the Court's 
decision in Penry, which allowed the execution of the developmentally 
disabled, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 122 the Court concluded that the execution of 
juveniles over age fifteen, but under age eighteen, was not cruel and unusual 
punishment. 123 In Simmons, the Court overruled Stanford. 124 As in Atkins, the 
116. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
117. Jd. at 324-25. Rehnquist noted that earlier decisions in this area looked to 
international opinions, but contended that the Court had since rejected this practice. !d. at 325. 
118. Jd. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia continued: 
Equally irrelevant are the practices of the "world community," whose notions of justice are 
(thankfully) not always those of our people. "We must never forget that it is a Constitution 
for the United States of America that we are expounding ... . [W]here there is not first a 
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened 
the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans 
through the Constitution." 
Jd. at 347-48 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
119. See id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
120. Jd. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
121. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2005) (addressing whether it is 
constitutionally permissible "to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger 
than 18 when he committed a capital crime"). 
122. Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
123. See id. at 380; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) 
(concluding that it would offend "standards of decency'' to execute any offender under the age 
of sixteen at the time of the crime). 
124. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574. 
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Court began by evaluating the internal discourse regarding the execution of 
juveniles. 125 The Court noted that at that time, thirty states prohibited 
imposition of the death penalty onjuveniles126 and that the trend oflegislative 
action since its decision in Stanford had consistently moved closer towards 
prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty onjuveniles. 127 The Court in 
Simmons found this trend particularly striking in light of the "general popularity 
of anticrime legislation," including a trend toward "cracking down" on juvenile 
crime in other respects. 128 The Court in Simmons also considered the 
underlying social purposes of the death penalty, which it identified as 
retribution and deterrence, and concluded that neither purpose is advanced by 
executing juveniles, given their "diminished culpability."129 Essentially, the 
Court in Simmons concluded that recognition of human dignity and special 
consideration for vulnerable groups, such as juveniles, outweigh the values of 
deterrence and retribution under today's standards of decency in the United 
States. 130 
The Court's conclusion about the standards of decency in the United States, 
however, is strongly buttressed through cross-cultural dialogue: 
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment 
for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United 
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction 
to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for 
the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility. 
Yet at least from the time of the Court's decision in Trop, the Court has 
referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as 
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 
"cruel and unusual punishments."131 
In the last section of the Simmons opinion, the Court discussed both the 
relevant international law and the practices of other nations. 132 The Court cited 
125. !d. at 560-68. 
126. This includes 12 states that reject the death penalty completely. !d. at 564. 
127. But the trend towards prohibition of the execution of juveniles has moved at a much 
slower pace than the trend towards the prohibition of the execution of the developmentally 
disabled. !d. at 565 (comparing Atkins, the Court noted the "[i]mpressive" rate of prohibition of 
the death penalty for the developmentally disabled). 
128. !d. at 566. 
129. !d. at 571 ("Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident 
that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to 
adults."). 
130. See id. at 571-74. The Court concluded that"[ w]hen a juvenile offender commits a 
heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State 
cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own 
humanity." !d. at 573-74. 
131. !d. at 575. 
132. See id. at 575-78. 
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various international human rights treaties: the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 133 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 134 the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 135 and the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child. 136 The Court also looked to the practices of 
other nations and noted that since 1990, only seven other countries-Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and China-have executed juveniles; each country has since either abolished or 
publicly disavowed the execution ofjuveniles.137 More specifically, the Court 
in Simmons examined the United Kingdom's abolition "in light of the historic 
ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's own 
origins," and noted that the United Kin~dom abolished the use of the death 
penalty for juveniles over 50 years ago. 1 8 
Perhaps anticipating the uproar that would result from the use of 
international materials, the Court stated that the "opinion of the world 
community" does not control the Court's decision, but rather provides 
"respected and significant confirmation" for the Court's conclusions.139 The 
Court then linked American values with international human rights standards to 
support its decision: 
The [Constitution] sets forth, and rests upon, innovative principles original to 
the American experience, such as federalism; a proven balance in political 
133. /d. at 576; see Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. A/44/25, at 171, U.N. 
GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). Article 37(a) provides: "No child shall 
be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither 
capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for 
offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age." !d. at art. 37. The United States is 
not a party to the Convention. 
134. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576; see ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 6(5). Article 6(5) states: 
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years 
of age .... " !d. The United States is a party to the Covenant, but has entered a specific 
reservation that purports to exclude the U.S. practice of executing juveniles: 
That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose 
capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under 
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such 
punishment for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 22, Mar. 24, 1992, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 
102-23 ( 1992). Interestingly, in Simmons, the petitioner argued that the ICCPR and the U.S. 
reservation supported its case. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 567. 
135. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576; see ACHR, supra note 87. Article 4(5) provides, in part: 
"Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was 
committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age .... " !d. 
136. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576; see African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
art. 5(3), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). Article 5(3) provides: "Death sentence shall 
not be pronounced for crimes committed by children." !d. 
137. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 577. 
138. /d. at 577-78. 
139. !d. at 578. 
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mechanisms through separation of powers; specific guarantees for the 
accused in criminal cases; and broad provisions to secure individual freedom 
and preserve human dignity. These doctrines and guarantees are central to 
the American experience and remain essential to our present-day self-
definition and national identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the 
Constitution, then, is because we know it to be our own. It does not lessen 
our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that 
the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and 
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom. 140 
Although the dissenting opinions would have reached a different result, 
they offered a somewhat parallel analysis. As in Atkins, Justice Scalia (joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) disagreed with the majority's 
assessment of the internal discourse on the death penalty for juveniles and 
rejected the use of cross-cultural dialogue to buttress that assessment. 141 Again 
Scalia argued that the "evolving standards of decency'' test permits the majority 
to impose its own views and values upon the nation. 142 But he also raised an 
important point about the risk of selectivity in using international norms. 
Although he conflated foreign law with international human rights law, Scalia 
suggested that the members of the majority would reject the "reciprocity'' 
aspect of cross-cultural dialogue in areas where it does not reflect their 
values. 143 
Justice O'Connor, dissenting from the majority, wrote a separate opinion to 
underscore her disagreement with the majority's assertion that a national 
consensus has emerged in opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. 144 
Nevertheless, O'Connor rejected Justice Scalia's contention "that foreign and 
140. !d. 
141. !d. at 607-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
142. See id. at 607-08. Scalia stated: 
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards-and in the 
course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views 
of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth 
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be 
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded 
foreigners, I dissent. 
!d. at 608. 
143. !d. at 624-27 (discussing foreign laws on the exclusionary rule, establishment of 
religion, and abortion). Scalia stated: 
The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all these matters in light of the 
views of foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners' views as part ofthe 
reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own 
thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry. 
!d. at 627. 
144. /d. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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international law have no place" in considering whether the punishment is cruel 
and unusual under evolving standards of decency. 145 She stated: 
[T]his Nation's evolving understanding ofhuman dignity certainly is neither 
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in 
other countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to fmd 
congruence between domestic and international values, especially where the 
international community has reached clear agreement--expressed in 
international law or in the domestic Jaws of individual countries- that a 
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. 
At least, the existence of an international consensus ofthis nature can serve 
to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American 
consensus. 
146 
Thus, the simple framework for advancing the cultural legitimacy of human 
rights articulated by An-Na'im unfolded in the Supreme Court as follows: the 
Court evaluated domestic practices in light of the practices of other nations and 
examined international human rights standards to inform the understanding of 
domestic constitutional law and standards, which resulted in rejection of the 
juvenile death penalty. 
B. "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, 
b I . if, • d • • . d n147 L fr e ze , expresswn, an certam mtzmate con uct : essons om 
Lawrence about the Human Rights to Privacy and Freedom from 
Discrimination. 
From an international human rights law perspective, the norms regarding 
homosexual conduct are not as clear as those addressing the death penalty. The 
issue can be considered as a matter of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or as a matter of individual or family privacy. If the issue is framed 
as a matter of nondiscrimination, it implicates a fundamental principle of 
international human rights law. 148 Nondiscrimination is highlighted in 
expansive terms in the International Bill of Rights instruments: the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 149 Obligations of nondiscrimination are also included in the major 
145. !d. ("Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to 
foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency." 
(citations omitted)). 
146. !d. at 605. 
147. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
148. The U.N. Charter includes nondiscrimination as fundamental principle of the United 
Nations. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (noting that one purpose of the United Nations is to 
promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"). 
149. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "All human beings are born free 
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regional human rights treaties. 15° Furthermore, two particular forms of 
discrimination-racial discrimination and discrimination against women-are 
the subjects of separate international conventions. 151 So far, there has been 
only one specific treaty reference to nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation;152 but much of the Reneral treaty language prohibits discrimination 
on undefined "other" grounds. 3 Though the issue of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation has received increasing international attention, the issue 
remains a relatively new subject of discussion at the international level. 
and equal in dignity and rights." UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 1. Article 2 provides: 
"Everyone is entitled to the all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status." /d. at art. 2. The major human rights 
Covenants include identical language. The ICESCR provides: "The States Parties to the 
present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will 
be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." ICESCR, 
supra note 30, at art. 2. The ICCPR states, "Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory . . . the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind .... " ICCPR, supra note 
10, at art. 2; see also U.N. Charter art. I (stating the purpose of"promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion"). 
150. See African Charter, supra note 24, at art. 2 (prohibiting distinction based on "race, 
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status"); ACHR, supra note 86, at art. 1 (prohibiting 
discrimination based on "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition"); European Convention, 
supra note 87, at art. 14 (prohibiting discrimination on "any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status"); see also The Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam, G.A. Res. 49/19-P, Annex, at art. l(a), U.N. Doc A/CONF.l57/PC/62/Add.18 
(June 9, 1993) ("All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and 
responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex ... or 
other considerations."). 
151 . See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms oflntolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171 , 
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (Nov. 25, 1981 ); CEDA W, supra note 56 (not ratified by the United States); 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 
56 (ratified by the United States). 
152. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states: "Any 
discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited." Charter of 
the Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, para. 1, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 13. 
153. See supra notes 149-50 (prohibiting discrimination based on "other status" or "other 
social condition"). 
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Alternatively, if the issue of sexual orientation is framed as a matter of 
privacy rights, the situation is similar. There are numerous human rights 
provisions addressing issues of personal privacy, particularly in the context of 
intimate and familial relationships as well as other personal liberty interests. 154 
But there is no explicit language pertaining to same-sex relationships. The 
nations of Western Europe, whose values and history the United States views as 
most similar to its own, offer more explicit protection to same-sex relationships, 
either domestically or through the regional human rights mechanisms. 155 But 
the privacy and liberty protection given to same-sex relationships remains a 
controversy in many places around the world. 156 
Domestically, of course, the internal discourse on same-sex relationships 
and intimate conduct continues in the United States. 157 Interestingly, in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 158 the Court appeared to follow the internal discourse -
154. See ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 23 ("The right of men and women of marriageable 
age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized."); ICESCR, supra note 30, at art. 10 
("The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society .... "); European Convention, supra note 87, at 
art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except as in accordance with the law .... "); UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 16 ("[M]en and 
women of full age . . . have the right to marry and to found a family .... Marriage shall be 
entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses."). 
155. See supra note 85 (listing protections provided by Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Iceland, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Britain, 
Canada, Argentina, New Zealand, South Africa, Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia, 
and Switzerland); see also Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309 
(finding that the decision of a Portuguese court denying custody to a parent on the basis of 
sexual orientation discriminated against the applicant in violation of articles 8 and 14 of the 
European Convention). 
156. "[T]he concept of family in the minds of the drafters of the Covenant was the 
traditional one of a man, a woman and, possibly, children. By introducing the concept of same-
sex couples, Denmark was eroding the original concept and violating the basic principal of 
article l 0." Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Summary Record oft he I 2th 
Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 12th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.l2/l999/SR.l2 (May6, 1999) 
(comments by Mr. Sadi). Canada's Parliament established a committee to research the issue; 
the committee determined "that the definition of marriage as the voluntary union between one 
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others was no longer acceptable under Canadian 
law." Committee on the Rights of the Child, Summary Record of the 895th Meeting,, 61, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/C/SR.895 (Sept. 17, 2003) (statement ofMr. Farber of Canada). Same-sex couples 
were already raising children and, therefore, "the legalization of same-sex unions would provide 
such children with the same rights as those enjoyed by children from traditional marriages." /d. 
157. The discourse regarding privacy interests and the prohibition of discrimination against 
same-sex relationships is at an earlier stage than the discourse concerning the death penalty. 
Religion and culture play powerful roles as the debate takes shape. But even in this context. 
human rights advocates are using values widely accepted in the United States, including 
nondiscrimination and privacy, to argue for a human rights-oriented approach. 
158. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
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cross-cultural dialogue construct in its rationale more closely than it did in the 
death penalty cases. As in Atkins and Simmons, the Court evaluated the history 
of the debate, noted changing public views, and overruled a previous decision 
to reach a human rights-based result. 159 Once again, the Court created 
controversy by looking outside the United States to examine the practices of 
other nations and the perspectives ofthe international community.160 
The opinion in Lawrence began by re-characterizing the rights at stake. 161 
In the 1986 case, Bowers v. Hardwick, 162 the Court upheld a Georgia statute 
criminalizing certain same-sex intimate conduct, finding that the Constitution 
does not confer "a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy."163 Almost twenty years later in Lawrence, the Court invalidated a 
similar Texas statute, framing the issue as a matter of private conduct in the 
"exercise of ... liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. 164 After re-characterizing the rights at stake in this more generous 
manner, the Court undertook a reinterpretation of the historical treatment of 
sodomy it relied upon in Bowers. 
The Court in Bowers had quashed any sense of internal discourse on the 
issue by connecting the criminalization of sodomy to "ancient roots" and 
presenting a picture of a long and unchanged historical condemnation of 
consensual sodomy. 165 In Lawrence, the Court destabilized that notion by 
carefully reexamining its history and reinterpreting sodomy prohibitions as 
general condemnations of non-procreative sex, rather than as established 
traditions of prosecuting homosexual conduct. 166 The general condemnation of 
159. !d. at 578-79. 
160. !d. at 572-73. "To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider 
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected 
elsewhere." /d. at 576. 
161. !d. at 562 (noting that the case "involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in 
its more transcendent dimensions"). 
162. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
163. !d. at 190, 196. 
164. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. The Court characterized the liberty interest broadly as 
"liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions." /d. at 562. 
The Court explained: 
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more 
than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, 
and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal 
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. 
!d. at 567. 
165. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94. 
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-74. The Court stated that it was only in the 1970s that 
states began singling out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution. !d. at 570 (noting that 
only nine states have criminalized same-sex relations). The Court also noted that some of those 
states have since moved towards abolishing the prohibitions. !d. 
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non-procreative sex has been the topic of much national debate; moreover, the 
private, intimate conduct of individuals has been subject to increasing 
protection by the Court for the past fifty years. 167 
In Lawrence, the Court openly addressed the importance of the social 
values at stake in this debate, particularly in the context of same-sex intimate 
conduct: 
The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right 
and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many 
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions 
accepted as ethical and moral princiEles to which they aspire and which thus 
determine the course of their lives. 1 8 
But the Court determined that recent laws and traditions are most relevant to 
defining the accepted scope of liberty. 169 The Court found "an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding 
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."170 After 
reviewing the current laws regarding intimate conduct, as in the death penalty 
cases, the Court relied upon the trend by individual states either to repeal laws 
criminalizing same-sex intimate conduct or to decline enforcement of those 
laws. 171 The Court emphasized the powerful impact of such laws and their 
resulting prosecutions on human dignity and the fundamental importance of the 
liberty interests at stake. 172 
167. The Court traced this history, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4 79 
( 1965) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the sale or use of contraception on grounds that the 
law infringed upon the right to privacy in marriage), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(extending Griswold to unmarried persons), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the 
right to an abortion is protected by liberty interests in Due Process Clause), and Carey v. 
Population Services lnt'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a law prohibiting sale of 
contraceptives to persons under 16 years of age). The Court also cited to more recent decisions, 
including Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming 
the constitutional protection of personal decisions regarding marriage, procreation, 
contraception, and family relationships), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking 
down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals). 
168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
169. Jd. at 571-72. 
170. Jd. at 572. 
171 . !d. at 573. The Court noted that the number of states with anti-sodomy laws dropped 
from twenty-five at the time of its decision in Bowers to thirteen at the time of its decision in 
Lawrence. In addition, only four of those states enforced their laws exclusively against 
homosexual intimate conduct. I d. Even in states with sodomy laws, there was a pattern of non-
enforcement in cases involving consenting adults acting in private. I d. 
172. I d. at 575-76. The court expressed concern about the consequences of such laws, 
including public and private discrimination, stigma, risk of prosecution, and collateral 
consequences of conviction. !d. 
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Nevertheless, the Court in Lawrence did not limit itself to consideration of 
the evolving national discourse. In its reevaluation of the historical and social 
context, the Court also included cross-cultural perspectives. 173 It explained that 
the British Parliament had considered repealing laws punishing homosexual 
conduct as early as 1957 and took steps in that direction in the 1960s. 174 The 
Court also mentioned the European Court ofHuman Rights' 1981 decision in 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom 175 and subsequent case law following its 
precedent.176 In Dudgeon, the European Court found that the laws ofNorthem 
Ireland prohibiting homosexual conduct violated the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 177 Noting that this "integral part of human freedom" has been 
recognized in many other countries, the Supreme Court concluded that it could 
not find justification for giving it less protection in the United States.178 
The majority decision in Lawrence used the language of human rights and 
human dignity, reframed the historical perspective to more fully reflect the 
ongoing internal discourse, and cited to cross-cultural developments protecting 
the interests at issue. 179 In this way, the Court has recognized and advanced the 
cultural legitimacy of human rights norms protecting privacy and prohibiting 
discrimination for same-sex relationships. Moreover, despite their different 
outcomes, both the concurring and dissenting opinions also fit within this 
methodological framework. 
The concurrence by Justice O'Connor framed the issue in the case as a 
matter of equal protection, rather than liberty and due process. 180 O'Connor 
used the familiar language of the equal protection analysis to make an argument 
that reflects fundamental principles of nondiscrimination: "I am confident, 
173. The Court explained, "[ w ]hen our precedent has been thus weakened, criticism from 
other sources is of greater significance." /d. at 576. 
174. /d. at572-73. 
175. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981). 
176. The Supreme Court noted that the European Court of Human Rights continued to 
follow its precedent in Dudgeon rather than giving consideration to the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Bowers. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
177. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. ~52. The Supreme Court in Lawrence pointed out that 
this decision is authoritative for all forty-five nations that are members of the Council of 
Europe. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
178. !d. at 577. 
179. The Lawrence opinion referenced numerous amici curiae, representing a wide range 
of perspectives. Amici included the Cato Institute, the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
Mary Robinson (former U.N. High Cornnlissioner for Human Rights). /d. at 568, 576-77. 
180. Likewise, the majority briefly addressed the issue as a matter of equal protection. It 
noted the connection between equal treatment and the due process right to "demand respect for 
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty." /d. at 575. But the Court was 
concerned that invalidation based on equal protection grounds would not go far enough and 
would be vulnerable to more carefully crafted laws. /d. The majority also determined that equal 
protection arguments would not address the important issues of stigma or dignity. /d. Further, 
it stated that the continued existence of Bowers as precedent "demeans the lives ofhomosexual 
persons." /d. 
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however, that so long as the Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to 
apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and 
heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic 
society."181 But O'Connor also noted that social values, such as national 
security and preserving the traditional institution of marriage, might be 
sufficient to overcome the value of equal treatment in other circumstances.182 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized a contrasting view of the internal 
national discourse and a fierce reaction to cross-cultural dialogue using stronger 
language than he used in the death penalty cases. He framed the issue squarely 
as a "culture war," and he used this characterization to reject the Court's 
involvement in advancing or determining that cultural evolution: 
It is clear from this that the Court bas taken sides in the culture war, departing 
from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of 
engagement are observed. Many Americans do not want persons who openly 
engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters 
for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in 
their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a 
lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it 
as "discrimination" which it is the function of our judgments to deter. So 
imbued is the Court with the law profession's anti-anti-homosexual culture, 
that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously 
"mainstream" .... 183 
Scalia also strongly rejected the cross-cultural perspective incorporated by 
the majority opinion as "meaningless" but"[ d]angerous dicta": "Constitutional 
entitlements do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen 
or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they spring 
into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations 
decriminalize conduct." 184 
In Lawrence, the Court followed the conceptual internal discourse- cross-
cultural dialogue framework, but their analysis unfolded somewhat differently 
than in the death penalty cases. The Court focused primarily on reinterpretin~ 
the domestic history and discourse on intimate conduct, as broadly defmed. 1 
The court used the language of human rights and human dignity, and it drew 
upon both the international human rights law developed by the European Court 
181. /d. at 584-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
182. /d. at 585. 
183. /d. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia later clarified: 
Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting 
their agenda through normal democratic means. Social perceptions of sexual and other 
morality change over time, and every group bas the right to persuade its fellow citizens that 
its view of such matters is the best. 
/d. at 603. 
184. /d. at 598 (emphasis added). 
185. /d. at 562-571 (majority opinion). 
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ofHuman Rights and the domestic practice of the United Kingdom. 186 In this 
way, the Court both recognized and advanced the cultural legitimacy ofhuman 
rights norms protecting privacy and prohibiting discrimination. But because 
the international human rights norms at stake are less explicit and more 
contested both domestically and globally, the value of the cross-cultural 
perspectives is more problematic. As a result, the cultural legitimacy of the 
decision-and the human rights values it advances- is perhaps more tenuous. 
C. Whose Law Will It Be? Looking Forward with the New Court. 
Although the recent decisions in Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons were 
authored by sitting members of the Court, 187 the Supreme Court has undergone 
a recent change in composition. With the retirement of Justice O'Connor and 
the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the membership of the Court now 
includes new Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. 188 The internal discourse 
on the propriety of the Court's consideration of international human rights 
standards was evident in both men's confirmation hearings. Former Judge 
Roberts responded to questioning on the issue from Senator Coburn: 
[Senator COBURN.] My question to you is, relying on foreign precedent and 
selecting and choosing a foreign precedent to create a bias outside of the laws 
of this country, is that good behavior? 
Judge ROBERTS. Well, I ... don't think it's a good approach. I wouldn't 
accuse judges or Justices who disagree with that, though, of violating their 
oath. I'd accuse them of getting it wrong on that point, and I'd hope to sit 
down with them and debate it and reason about it. 
Senator COBURN. Can the American people count on you to not use foreign 
precedent in your decision making on the Supreme Court? 
Judge ROBERTS. You know, I will follow the Supreme Court' s precedents 
consistent with the principles of stare decisis, and there are cases in this area, 
186. /d. at 572-73. 
187. Justice Stevens authored the 2002 opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 
(2002). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Jd. Justice 
Kennedy authored both the 2003 opinion in Lawrence v. Texas and the 2005 decision in Roper 
v. Simmons and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in both decisions. 
Roper v. ~immons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561. Justice O'Connor 
concurred in the result in Lawrence and dissented in Simmons; Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in both cases. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 554; Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 561. 
188. The Senate confirmed John Roberts by a vote of78-22, and he was sworn in as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court on September 29, 2005. Charlie Savage, Roberts Becomes 
Nation's 17th Chief Justice, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2005, at A 1, available at 2005 WLNR 
15425224. After being confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 58-42, Samuel Ali to Jr. was sworn 
in on January 31 , 2006. Glenn Thrush, Amid Bitter Split, Senate Oks A/ito, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 
2006, at A02, available at 2006 WLNR 1775822. 
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of course. That's why we're having the debate. The Court has looked at 
those. I think it's fair to say, in the prior opinions, those are not 
determinative in the sense that the precedent turned entirely on foreign law, 
so it's not a question of whether or not you'd be departing from these cases if 
you decided not to use foreign law. 189 
707 
Roberts also had a lengthy exchange with Senator Kyl on the issue. 190 
Senator Kyl specifically referred to Roper v. Simmons in his questioning. 19 1 A 
few months later, then Judge Alito faced similar questions and he was even 
more explicit in his response: 
[Senator KYL.] What is the proper role, in your view, of foreign law in U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, and when. if ever, is citation to or reliance on these 
foreign laws appropriate? 
Judge ALITO. I don't think that foreign law is helpful in interpreting the 
Constitution. Our Constitution does two basic things. It sets out the structure 
of our Government and it protects fundamental rights. The structure of our 
Government is unique to our country, and so I don't think that looking to 
decisions of supreme courts of other countries or constitutional courts in other 
countries is very helpful in deciding questions relating to the structure of our 
government. 
As for the protection of individual rights, I think that we should look to 
our own Constitution and our own precedents .. .. 
We have our own law, we have our own traditions, we have our own 
precedents, and we should look to that in interpreting our Constitution .. . . 
[Senator COBURN.] The question I have for you-and I could not get Judge 
Roberts to answer it because of the conflict that might occur afterwards, but I 
have the feeling that the vast majority of Americans do not think it is proper 
for the Supreme Court to use foreign law. . . . I just wondered if you bad any 
comments on that comment. 
Judge ALITO. Well, I don't think that we should look to foreign law to 
interpret our own Constitution .. .. I think the Framers would be stunned by 
the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of the 
countries of the world .. .. The Framers did not want Americans to have the 
rights of people in France or the rights of people in Russia, or any of the other 
countries on the continent of Europe at the time. They wanted them to have 
the rights of Americans, and I think we should interpret our Constitution- we 
should inte~ret our Constitution. I don' t think it's appropriate to look to 
foreign law. 92 
189. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 18. 
190. !d. 
191 . Although Judge Roberts declined to comment on the specific case, he raised general 
concerns about the use of "foreign law" as contrary to democratic theory and as improperly 
expanding judicial discretion. !d. 
192. A/ito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 3. Alito also commented on the issue in 
response to questioning from Senators Leahy (affirming that English common law may help in 
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Both nominees were firm in their renunciation of the use of"foreign" law 
sources. This approach would accord with that of former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, but differ from that of former Justice O'Connor. 193 The other 
members ofthe Court are split in their attitudes toward the use of international 
law: Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer194 have referred 
to international law and will likely continue to do so; Justices Scalia and 
Thomas 195 have been adamantly opposed to such use and will likely continue to 
be. Thus, one would expect that the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito will slightly shift the Court's willingness to consider, and certainly 
to cite, international and foreign law sources. 
But it is not just the addition of new members to the Court that may change 
its willingness to consider international law and the practices of other nations. 
The public interest, and often public outcry, on this issue is likely to have an 
effect. 196 The prominent questioning of the nominees by members of Congress, 
understanding United States law) and Kohl (clarifying that he does not think it is proper to look 
to foreign law in interpreting the constitution, but that it may be helpful in looking to the 
practices of foreign countries in how they organize their constitutional courts). Jd. 
193. Chief Justice Rehnquist was explicit in his views in Atkins v. Virginia: 
I write separately, however, to call attention to the defects in the Court's decision to place 
weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion 
polls in reaching its conclusion. The Court's suggestion that these sources are relevant to 
the constitutional question finds little support in our precedents and, in my view, is 
antithetical to considerations of federalism .... 
536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In contrast, Justice 
O'Connor wrote separately in Roper v. Simmons to affirm her view that it was appropriate for 
the Court to consider foreign and international law: "I disagree with Justice Scalia's contention 
that foreign and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over 
the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and 
international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency." 543 U.S. 551, 
604 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
194. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 554; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305; 
see also Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could 
Change the Supreme Court, THE NEw YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (describing Justice 
Kennedy's "passion" for foreign and international law); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, "A Decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.asil.org/events/ AM05/ginsburg05040 l.html ("lfU .S. experience and decisions can 
be instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for 
constitutionality, so we can learn from others now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and 
executive actions against charters securing basic rights."). 
195. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 607 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (Scalia, J., and 
Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Lane, supra note 4, at A 1 (accounting the debate between 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen G. Breyer at American University Washington 
College of Law over the Supreme Court's use of foreign law in its own decisions). 
196. In fact, the use of these cross-cultural sources has become a part of the broader 
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the proposed Congressional Resolution to prohibit the use of foreign sources by 
the Court, and the public statements by members of the administration197 all 
suggest that the easiest course for the Court would be to refrain from further 
invocation of international law, practice, or norms. That would seem to be the 
politically wise choice, and given the supplementary part these sources have 
played in the decisions themselves, a choice with little real cost. Yet, such a 
conclusion ultimately reflects a misunderstanding of the importance of the 
dynamic at work in this process. The Court has an important function in both 
the internal, domestic discourse on human rights norms and in the ongoing 
cross-cultural dialogue on those norms. It remains to be seen what roles Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will assume in that process, but it is unlikely 
that the Court will abandon its responsibility to participate in and stimulate 
dialogue completely. 
CONCLUSION 
The bounds and content of the relationship between the United States and 
other nations in the international community always provide interesting, and 
often provocative, questions. Equally provocative, at both the domestic and 
international levels, is the role that "outsiders" should play in changing the 
nature of a domestic legal or cultural system. The United States appears 
increasingly willing to be that outsider by providing guidance or insisting on 
the implementation of international legal obligations, including human rights 
obligations, in the domestic systems of other nations. The United States has 
been less willing to re-examine its own domestic laws and policies, viewing 
cross-cultural or international input as that of outsiders who are imposing their 
views on the nation; many in the nation believe that accepting outsider input 
would offend national sovereignty and be inconsistent with domestic views and 
values. 
Does this resistance reflect the success of efforts to change international 
human rights standards to be more reflective of other cultural perspectives? If 
the controversial cases revolved around economic, social, and cultural rights, 
the assertion may be persuasive. But the decisions on the death penalty and 
sodomy laws involve basic civil and political rights, which have historically 
been viewed as most compatible with U.S. notions of individual rights. Is the 
rejection of international sources a reflection of a post-911 1 United States that 
views any outside involvement as suspect? It is true that there may be a more 
isolationist sentiment in the United States now, but the current debate about the 
death penalty long preceded the events of 9/11, and the controversy around 
same-sex relationships has no apparent connection to concerns about terrorism 
and national security. 
internal discourse on the substance of the human rights norms at issue in the cases. See supra 
Part I.B. 
197. See supra notes 4, 28 and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps Professor An-Na'im's suggestions, which focus on the importance 
of the domestic cultural (and religious) context at any given time, provide a 
simple approach for examining a complex problem. American 
"exceptionalism" on this issue is not exceptional at all. The recent Supreme 
Court decisions-Atkins, Simmons, and Lawrence-suggest that there may be a 
growing openness to an internal re-examination on human rights protections in 
the United States and to a cross-cultural dialogue on these issues. But the 
outcry in response to the proposed use of human rights law suggests reasons to 
remain cautious. The confirmation hearings ofboth new Justices have included 
direct questioning on these decisions and the role of foreign and international 
law in Supreme Court decisions. 
From a normative and legal human rights perspective, the significant issue 
is the development of cultural legitimacy, rather than purely formal 
implementation. If limiting or abolishing the death penalty is viewed as 
integral to a system of American justice and fundamental for the protection of 
the right to life, then it will be accepted in the United States. If recognizing the 
privacy of intimate relationships between persons of the same sex is considered 
a logical extension of the existing protection for intimate relationships and a 
commitment to equal treatment, then the political support will exist to ensure 
that liberty. If the values reflect the culture of the United States and can serve 
as both a model to and reflection of the values of the broader global 
community, then the laws and the implementation of those laws, both domestic 
and international, will follow. 
